1.The present exposé on terrorism does not intend to give a universalist assessment of the phenomenon of terrorism. It is supposed to highlight a phenomenon which has a specific nature, peculiar to the political and socio-economic conditions that generated it in Algeria and which seems to be disappearing within the new context of political pluralism.

2. The terrorism phenomenon dealt with in this case is related to the extreme armed violence, instrumented by a religious and political trend of anti-democratic nature which seeked to seize power in Algeria by all means.

3. Even if the violent and armed trend benefited of external ramifications within the framework of a global network having internationalist objectives notably the establishment of a fundamentalist republic based on a reactionary interpretation of religions priciples extraneous to the muslim society in the Maghreb. One must naturally try to draw every lesson as concerns the outbreak, rising and decline of terrorism in Algeria on the national and international levels. But these lessons will be of partial character for we must have a historical approach to this phenomenon in order to move forward towards more certainty and make global-range conclusions.

4. Often when the international community, or the public opinion movement are disconcerted by an event or strive to find an immediate and rational explanation, they yield to the temptation of a rapid and oversimplified explanation which highlights deliberately of the factual side.

5. From this point of view, the most questionable explanation concerning the very origins of the terrorist phenomenon in Algeria is related to the idea that terrorist violence spontaeousely outbroke after the cancellation of the elections of february 1992. The debate, abroad, consisted of backing this thesis, which amounts to reducing the scope of a political-takeover strategy in Algeria by an international fundamentalist-movement's branch; an on- going strategy since the begining of the 80's, which went unnoticed for the political analysts who unquestionably haven't perceived the underlying force of this movement..

6. One can,without doubt, assert that the fundamentalist religious movement in Algeria which degenerated in 1992 into a violent movement, began to "surf" on the existing contradictions between the right and left-wing among the algerian society and between the left-wing and right-wing of the F.L.N (National Liberation Front) by the end of the 70's (death of President Boumedienne). At that period, indeed, each of the two trends strive to give Algeria after Boumedienne's era a liberal ideological orientation or, on the contrary, an orientation based upon the hegemonic rule of the FLN Party over the state and the civil society.

7. This confrontation between two political trends during the 50's either in the FLN's apparatus or within the State, began to affect the civil society through the violent confrontation in the university campus and within the youth movement between a left-wing composed of the FLN left-wing related to the underground communist party and a mouvement linked to the extreme right-wing of the FLN ; itself related to the fundamentalist religious movement of the frères musulmans (muslim brothers) which appeared in Algeria during the 70's.

8. Thus, there was two conflicting projects of society, two antinomic projets that could in no way communicate within a monolithic political and cultural space, controlled by the FLN, following the example of the former socialist countries. At that moment, violence stemed from the status and role of women in the society. Since the 70’s, while a women-liberation movement was developing in Algeria, a violent movement emerged unlike the general tendancy. An idelogical, political, cultural and social breakdown began to appear. In this context, the lucid persons discerned the premises of a future strong antagonism, social unrest; but no one could have imagined the subsquent developments.

9. Parallel to this internal social evolution, the conservative trend did not accept the leftist foreign-policy orientation of the Algerian State which was also badly perceived by some Middle East Powers who, later, financially backed and ideologically covered the fundamentalist and terrorist movement, so as to takeover Algeria which seemed to be won over by the left-wing at the international level.

10. During these struggles, the FLN’s extreme-right leaned more and more on the fundamentalist movement with a view to neutralizing the leftist movement. This ideological conflict between these two trends has created a deep identity-related crisis so much that the algerians considered their sisters, fathers, mothers and friends ennemies of Islam liable to death penalty.

11. As concerns politicking manipulations, the sub-political product often grows uncontrollably and develops according to a mass-independant logic and dynamic to finally to aspire to sieze power by using violence.

12. This is exactly what happened by the end of the 80’s when, following the street-demonstrations of young people severely affected by the emerging economic crisis as a result of the oil-drop prices in 1986, the fundamentalist movement undertook to take over this protest movement against the Establishment henceforth unpopular and bewildered by the crisis extent. This movement began indeed to « Surf » on to the legitmate protest movement of the youth in the mosques, from which its elements were recruited, and created an armed branch whose members demonstrated in the streets in 1990 and 1991 to openely challenge a decaying political and adminstrative authority. The first victims of the killings were women.

EXTERNAL FACTORS

13. It is within an internal ideological and political struggle, exacerbated with the economic crisis by the end of the 80’s, that appeared on the scene not an islamist movement but a fundamentalist and violent one, eager to transpose the Afghan-war in Algeria.

14. We should notice in this regard that the war that the civil Algerian Muslim Society by the violent and extremist branch of the fundamentalist movement seems to be a result of the cold-war end.

15. With the post cold-war era and defeat of the Soviet troopsin Afghanistan, the fightin troops recruited by means of arab and american funds within the Muslim countries, redeployed in Algeria and thus constitued the ruthless hard-core of the armed groups.

16. These troops originating from Afghanistan developed an implacable massive murders logic. A murder logic leading inevitably to the scorched earth with a view to creating the conditions for the establishement of a state submitted to their religious and moral references, which are totally extraneous to the values of Islam.

17. If one can consider the fact that Algeria has been an indirect victim of the end of the cold war, we can assert that the internal political, economic and institutional weakening made the country fragile as to the external pressures and allowed the rapid spreading of a terrorist phenomen on of an unknow nature and scale.

The strategies of terrorism

18. In Algeria, the terrorist movement had a political objective and an internal destabilizating strategy aiming at toppling the state, transforming the society and isolating the country from its regional and international environment in order to carry its strategy through completion.

19. the first stage of this methodic action of state and society destablization consisted at the outset of decimating the country's intelligentsia. A specific terrorist group specialized in the killing of the executives, artists, journalists and working women who were asked to stop working, physicians, religious figures expressing different viewpoints. This wave of killings weakened the country and everyone was then a potential target of terrorism. The killings were perpetrated by day and night alike, in the houses, streets and mosques.

20. In the meantime, another group was specialized, yet in the cities, in the assassination of security forces and the destruction of every state related institution like the local government services. The terrorist movement launched several destruction operation of the country's administrative, economic cultural and social infrastructures. The factories, bridges, railroad network, schools, cultural centres were systematically destroyed and burned down. Cities and villages were subjected to the terror day and night alike.

21. The strategy of terror also affected the foreign interests in Algeria, firstly the foreingn citizens who wera assassinated. This wave of assassinations made the foreigners, the air and foreign companies fled the country. They fully fled except for the oil sector which was guaranteeing the best security conditions in the Sahara and continued to benfit of investments. On the economic and financial plan, the insurance companies highly paid the withdrawal of foreign interests, as well as the financial institutions whose financial conditions as for short and medium term credits were very severe, which is liable to discourage the commercial operations and the investment.

22. The terrorism undoubtly has, to a certain extent reached its weakening-objective of the country's economy by making the foreign partners suspicious.

23. This internal extreme-tension strategy carried out by the terrorist groups was backed by a phenomenal world propaganda network notbly in Europe. Some poweful european and american media, N.G.O.'S and governments, lately friends of Algeria, confered the terrorist movement a political, ideological and even religious legitimacy. These groups were depicted as a liberation movement persecuted by a government and a republican state which would fall sooner or later ; they were also represented as liberators by the western and Eastern media for the benefit of the terrorist groups and the backing fundamentalist trend.

24. paradoxically, while a new political phenomenon was in the process of emerging in Algeria and while the country was facing a destabilization mouvement threatening the whole region, the terrorist groups benfited of the international support, though active or passive, by forwading arms and men and through financial means to the benefit of the terrorist networks in Algeria.

25. During these years, terrorist networks established in Europe to support the armed groups by taking advantage of the liberal legislations of the democratic countries. A number of terrorists were able to set up lawfully in Europe and thus organized new terrorist-financing and arms forwarding networks.

The counter terrorism Strategy

26. Two major elements will bring about a reversal of fortune unfavourable to the terrorist groups and reinforce the double-sided strategy carried out against terrorism. It concerns the terrorist attempts in Europe, notably in France and Belgium and the transition to the scale of massive massacres against the populations that has ceased providing support for the armed groups.

27. The attempts in Europe showed that terrorism is borderless and may emerge even within democratic societies deeming themselves safe from this violence. The terrorism may also affect states who used to think that this problem concerns only Algeria which should deal with it, without any international cooperation.

28. During the hardest years of counterterrorism fighting, the international cooperation was unefficient. Il is true that some political scenarios considered irreversible the political victory of the terrorism. In this perspective, a negociation-platform called "contrat de Rome" was developed by a coalition of algerian political leaders with terrorist groups' leaders with a view to taking advantage from the weakness of the algerian state and impose a historical compromise with the fundamentalist movement. The rejection of this platform lead the terrorist movement to more radicalism.

29. We can consider that the people's mobilization with the state was a watershed when the terrorist groups massively retaliated against the civil populations subjected for long to racket, violences and to the terrorist groups' rule. The population yet massively swung when the terrorist groups' nature was unveiled, and when it became obvious that the "fighters" called islamists who savagely assassinated thein brethren, in the name of islam, are in reality of a mutant species totally extraneous to their own religion.

30. The State's anti-terrorist strategy was based on two aspects: the political and security ones. The political aspect consisted of resuming the pluralism-policy, the elections process (presidential and general elections) and to rehabilitate the local and national institutions weakened by the mismangement and terrorism. The security aspect consisted of a parallel merciless fighting against the terrorist groups untill they definitely loose the political battle.

31. The re-opening of the political field, the reinforcement of press-freedom, individual liberties, the holding of pluralistic presidential and general elections gained people's support, in spite of the retaliation threats of the terrorist groups. The population get involved in the anti-terrorist fighting through the constitution of self-defense groups ruled by law.

32. The population's implication in reaction to the large scale exactions of the terrorist groups made the latter retreat to the mountains where, cut off from the population, they began to split up. Their "struggle" turned into crime and settling of score between rival factions to share out the booty.

33. The law concerning the civil concord implemented now and until january 13^th, is increasing the terrorist-groups split-up and in the meantime give those who have not committed blood-related crimes a chance to re-integrate the society. We must, however, consider that we will face a residual terrorism with a low intensity for a certain time; a politically-dismantled terrorism which would no longer threaten the country's internal stability and which is no more an impeding factor to the investment's boosting, but remain a potential threat at a defined and restricted scale.

34. But, to definitely eradicate terrorism, a more important challenge is to be took up with this new millenium : the rapid economic development to guarantee a long-term social stability.

November 1999